ProofRoom replaces subjective platform trust with cryptographic evidence. Inspect our live Intel TDX attestation reports, threat boundaries, and formal specifications.
Confidential AI execution enclave via NEAR AI Cloud
Test ProofRoom's fail-closed guarantee by injecting invalid quotes or expired nonces to confirm the application refuses to send confidential data when evidence is untrusted.
Explicit technical classification of what ProofRoom cryptographically guarantees and explicit boundaries.
| Threat scenario | Mitigation mechanism | Guarantee | Engineering detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| Compromised object storage provider | AES-256-GCM client-side encryption | Protected | Document blobs are encrypted using unique 256-bit random keys generated in browser memory. Stored blobs are ciphertext only. |
| Malicious backend operator / DB inspection | Zero plaintext & zero private key storage | Protected | The application database stores only encrypted key envelopes and opaque commitment hashes. Private keys never leave client memory. |
| Unauthorized room access / key interception | X25519 asymmetric envelope KEM | Protected | Document DEKs are wrapped strictly for the X25519 public keys of explicitly authorized participants. Third parties cannot unwrap envelopes. |
| Cloud host snooping on AI inference | Intel TDX hardware-isolated TEE enclave | Protected | Inference runs inside a Trust Domain with hardware-encrypted RAM. Cloud operators and hypervisors cannot inspect memory during execution. |
| Forged or tampered AI responses | Enclave digital signature verification | Protected | Enclaves digitally sign the combined hash of prompt request and response. Tampered outputs fail client verification immediately. |
| Replay attacks on attestation or auth | Cryptographic fresh nonce validation | Protected | Single-use 32-byte nonces are bound into the hardware ReportData and NEP-413 wallet challenges to prevent replays. |
| Authorized participant screen capture | Physical monitor boundary | Not protected | An authorized person who legitimately decrypts a document on their screen can photograph their monitor. Software cannot prevent physical photographs. |
| Information downloaded prior to revocation | Future key delivery halted | Not protected | Revocation immediately prevents future downloads and halts key distribution for future versions. It cannot delete local copies already saved. |
AES-256-GCM client-side encryption
Document blobs are encrypted using unique 256-bit random keys generated in browser memory. Stored blobs are ciphertext only.
Zero plaintext & zero private key storage
The application database stores only encrypted key envelopes and opaque commitment hashes. Private keys never leave client memory.
X25519 asymmetric envelope KEM
Document DEKs are wrapped strictly for the X25519 public keys of explicitly authorized participants. Third parties cannot unwrap envelopes.
Intel TDX hardware-isolated TEE enclave
Inference runs inside a Trust Domain with hardware-encrypted RAM. Cloud operators and hypervisors cannot inspect memory during execution.
Enclave digital signature verification
Enclaves digitally sign the combined hash of prompt request and response. Tampered outputs fail client verification immediately.
Cryptographic fresh nonce validation
Single-use 32-byte nonces are bound into the hardware ReportData and NEP-413 wallet challenges to prevent replays.
Physical monitor boundary
An authorized person who legitimately decrypts a document on their screen can photograph their monitor. Software cannot prevent physical photographs.
Future key delivery halted
Revocation immediately prevents future downloads and halts key distribution for future versions. It cannot delete local copies already saved.
AES-256-GCM
Unique 256-bit DEK per document, 96-bit random IV, 128-bit authentication tag
X25519 + HKDF-SHA256
RFC 8439 / ECIES-style key agreement derived with domain-separated salt & info
Intel TDX via NEAR AI Cloud
Hardware MKTME memory encryption, verified MRTD and RTMR measurements
ECDSA P-256 / Ed25519
Hardware enclave digital signature over sha256(request_hash || response_hash)
NEP-413 wallet challenges
Single-use signed authentication nonces anchored to NEAR account IDs
NEAR Testnet smart contract
Opaque commitments (room_commitment, document_hash, receipt_hash) on NEAR Testnet